Pro-independence rally in Erbil in September 2017. Photo Levi Clancy/Wikimedia
Iraqi Kurdistan is governed by two majority parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). This division has led to political paralysis and caused a social and economic crisis. Insights from Tom Préel, PhD student specialising in the governance of the population by the PUK.
Interviewed by Antoine Carré & Charlotte Dessolin
How is political power organized today in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan?
Tom Préel. The Kurdish political landscape remains structured around two dominant parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which have shared power since the early 1990s. This division was institutionalized with the so-called “50-50” system, established after 1992 to ensure that neither party could gain institutional ascendancy.
This compromise allowed both parties to remain in power and in control of resources, but it also entrenched a system based on informal negotiations outside institutional political spaces.
After the Kurdish civil war, this logic led to a de facto territorial separation between UPK and PDK areas, which still exists today.
Since 2017, there has been a return of the increasingly strong Iraqi central government, even if it remains limited by the existence of Shiite militias. On the Kurdish side, however, institutional deadlocks are extremely strong.
The regional elections scheduled for 2022 did not take place until 2024, and more than a year after the vote, there is still no announcement of a government. Tensions are crystallizing around negotiations between parties and the role of the Kurds in the political balance in Baghdad.
Tom Préel.
What economic and social consequences does this political configuration have for the population?
Tom Préel. The parties largely survive thanks to clientelism, i.e., the mobilization of public resources to offer jobs, buy loyalty, and win votes. Since the 1990s, administrations have been built on the objectification of activist networks, where access to positions depended on participation in the revolution and proximity to leaders.
And this mode of operation continues. Virtually all administrations are controlled either by the UPK or the PDK, and access to resources remains highly partisan. But this system is becoming increasingly fragile. Since the 2010s, there has been an inability to pay salaries, with reductions of up to 70% and nearly 40% of public salaries not distributed since 2015.
This economic crisis is fueling widespread fatigue and an erosion of ideological and revolutionary legitimacy, especially as promises of modernization, transparency, and political participation have not been kept.
Historical timeline of Iraqi Kurdistan. Made by Charlotte Dessolin/EPJT
How is the population coping with this situation?
Tom Préel. The population is largely weary and critical, but this criticism is not expressed in the same way across all territories. In areas controlled by the UPK, it is easier to criticize, while in PDK territories, it is much more complicated, and it is difficult to talk about politics outside of private spaces.
In these areas, demonstrations are prohibited, except those specifically authorized by the authorities, and dissenting voices are quickly imprisoned, arrested, beaten, and sometimes even killed. This repression coexists with an increasingly wide generation gap. Young people, who did not know Saddam Hussein, reject revolutionary participation as a means of legitimization and denounce a system where access to university and jobs is largely defined by party affiliation.
This disconnect fuels deep disillusionment and growing pragmatism. More and more people are wondering whether Baghdad might not be a more viable option after all, without completely abandoning the idea of autonomy or independence.